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Abstract—Source location privacy (SLP) is becoming an impor-
tant property for a large class of security-critical wireless sensor
network applications such as monitoring and tracking. Much of
the previous work on SLP has focused on the development of
various protocols to enhance the level of SLP imparted to the
network, under various attacker models and other conditions.
Other work has focused on analysing the level of SLP being
imparted by a specific protocol. In this paper, we adopt a different
approach where we model the attacker movement as a time series
and use information theoretic concepts to infer the properties of
a routing protocol that imparts high levels of SLP. We propose
the notion of a properly competing path that causes an attacker to
“stall” when moving towards the source. This concept provides
the basis for developing a perturbation model, similar to those
in privacy-preserving data mining. We then show how to use
properly competing paths to develop properties of an SLP-aware
routing protocol. Further, we show how different SLP-aware
routing protocols can be obtained through different instantiations
of the framework. Those instantiations are obtained based on
a notion of information loss achieved through the use of the
perturbation model proposed.
Index Terms—Source Location Privacy; Wireless Sensor Net-
works; Entropy; Mutual Information; Time Series.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks present a difficult challenge in
creating secure and private applications due to their potential to
expose important information about the environment that they
exist in due to the broadcast nature of wireless communications.
As messages are broadcasted, they can be eavesdropped by
a malicious attacker. Even if encryption is used to protect
the content of a message the context of the broadcast is still
exposed for a malicious eavesdropper to take advantage of.
One such context problem is that of Source Location Privacy
(SLP), where attackers can monitor the pattern of broadcasts
to gain knowledge about the location of the source of these
messages.
Source Location Privacy was initially introduced in terms of
the panda-hunter game [1] where a WSN has been deployed
across a large area to monitor pandas in their natural habitat.
Using a directional antenna, it was shown that an attacker could
identify the location of the immediate source of a message
and, using this information, trace messages back through the
system and find the ultimate source of the messages and thus
the panda (or other asset). SLP protection schemes aim to
protect against this scenario though various techniques. Many
techniques centre around increasing the time an attacker would
take to capture the source by changing the routing protocol.
There has been much work on SLP [2, 3], with many
new techniques having been developed, and the performance
typically being evaluated through large-scale simulations. There
are also several works that have developed models to analyse
the privacy provided by their technique or protocol. However,
these models tend to be specific to the type or nature of the
technique. In this paper, we adopt a novel approach based
on information theoretic arguments [4]. We assume a local
eavesdropper attacker and model his movement as a (clear data)
time series. Then, similar to the case for privacy-preserving
data mining, we develop an approach for perturbing the clear
data time-series to obtain a noisy time-series. However, unlike
in privacy-preserving data mining where there is trade-off
between information loss and privacy loss, no such trade-off is
required here, meaning that information loss can be maximized,
if possible, to minimize privacy loss.
We use a suitable definition of information loss and, together
with the mutual information metric, use them to determine the
properties of an SLP-aware routing protocol. Specifically, we
develop a perturbation model such that the normal routing
protocol, which is not SLP-aware, is transformed into an
SLP-aware routing protocol whereby (i) a source can still
do convergecast communication and (ii) the attacker cannot
reach the source within a prespecified time limit. In essence, the
SLP-aware routing protocol applies the perturbation technique
to perturb the clear time series to generates a noisy time series,
from which the attacker can learn little in identifying the
source. Such an approach is beneficial as (i) it does not make
any assumptions about the nature of the attacks and (ii) it
does not make any assumptions about any particular protocol
implementation.
We propose a novel concept called proper competing paths
that captures the problem of whether the attacker can be “stalled”
when moving towards the source. Proper competing paths are
central to the perturbation model we propose in that (i) wherever
proper competing paths exist, there is an increased entropy at
that point, (ii) noisy time series made up of proper competing
paths are more likely to have very small mutual information
with the corresponding clear data time series. We will later
explain how the technique can be adapted to generate state-of-
the-art SLP-aware routing protocols. Specifically, we make the
following contributions:
• We formalize the design of an SLP-aware problem as a
transformation problem.
• Using information theoretic concepts, we derive the
requirements necessary to minimize the amount of in-
formation leaked by a noisy time series.
• We develop the concept of proper competing paths that
underpin the perturbation model proposed.
• We propose two heuristics to (i) compute the set of proper
perturbation paths and to (ii) transform a normal routing
protocol into an SLP-aware routing protocol.
• We explain how the heuristic can be optimized to obtain
state-of-the-art SLP-aware routing protocol.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: in Section II we
cover the related work, including other model-based approaches
to developing SLP solutions. Section III contains a description
of the network, privacy and attacker models. Section IV outlines
the problem statement and details the analysis used to guide
SLP protocol development. The perturbation model is described
in Section V and an example case study is presented in
Section VI. In Section VII we discuss some of the issues
raised with our work and finally we conclude in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In the seminal work [1] the authors proposed a solution called
phantom routing, where a directed random walk away from or
towards a landmark node is first performed to a phantom node
before that message is flooded in the network. An optimised
version used a single path route from the phantom node to
optimise the energy usage [5]. There has been much work
developing improved version of the directed random walk
phase of phantom routing, such as GROW [6] which uses a
bloom filter to prevent the walk doubling back on itself and
angle-based techniques [7, 8] which calculate angles between
certain nodes to influence the direction of the walk. Other
techniques have adapted the random walk such that it forms a
ring around the source and messages are routed through the
ring before being forwarded onwards to the source [9, 10].
Another technique has been to use fake sources, which are
nodes in the network that broadcast messages encrypted and
padded to be indistinguishable from normal messages from
the source. There have been several implementations [11, 12]
with the latest focusing on implementing a protocol that can
dynamically determine good parameters to use online [13]. A
criticism of fake sources is that they tend to use more energy
compared to phantom routing.
Other techniques consist of a hybrid between generating
fake messages and having messages modify their routing path.
One example is tree-based diversionary routing [14] which
imposes a tree structure on the network and then routes fake
messages through the tree. The idea of fogs or clouds [15, 16]
is also similar where a normal message is routed round a group
of nodes called a fog and then onwards to other fogs. Fake
messages are used to provide additional privacy.
Many of the techniques described thus far demonstrated
their performance by simulation. There have only been a few
approaches where information theoretic, statistical models or
analysis have been used to either assist in designing a SLP
protocol or evaluating how well it performs. For example, [17]
developed a global protection scheme called Periodic in which
every node send a message after a fixed period. This allowed
perfect protection against an attacker with a global view of
the network. In designing this solution the authors created a
model involving traces of source detections, which was used
to measure the privacy of those traces as well as the energy
cost of providing SLP.
Following the global attacker theme, [18] took a different
approach where statistical techniques were used to show
that their global protection scheme provided high levels of
SLP. This approach did not provide perfect global SLP
as [17] did, but instead provided statistically strong SLP.
Their model and solution aimed to make the distribution of
message broadcasts from nodes indistinguishable from a certain
statistical distribution (using the Anderson-Darling Test).
Other global protection schemes such as [19, 20] have
also performed an analysis of their algorithms to justify their
effectiveness. Although global protection schemes tend to be
easier to formalise and reason about compared to providing
SLP against a local attacker, there have been several different
analysis approaches. In [21] the amount of source-location
information that an individual message can leak to attackers
was measured. They go on to analyse the effect of multiple
routing paths originating from the source node, showing that
more paths of longer lengths increases the SLP provided.
In [22] the authors performed an analysis to determine the
safety period for their technique (the higher the safety period
the greater the SLP provided). Their analysis focused on a
tree-based scheme and how an attacker would navigate it. Their
analysis requires a bounded time for message forwarding and
that the number of messages repeated follows the Poisson
probability distribution.
[23] takes a different approach and uses a thorough informa-
tion theoretic analysis. The location of the asset is modelled
as a random variable with the value in the set of all network
nodes. Using a matrix of message forwarding probabilities
the quantity of location information leaked is calculated. This
solution is the most general as it does not rely on individual
paths. However, the formalisation of the routing matrix is
unlikely to be applicable to more complicated local routing
schemes.
These analyses succeeded in assisting with the techniques
they accompanied, but, there are deficiencies in these local
routing analyses. For example a network may contain many
separate routing paths, but if an attacker never encounters them
then they will not increase the location privacy as [23] says
they should. Also many analyses focus on paths that solely
originate from the source, none have taken the perspective of
fake sources or multiple real sources and how they affect the
information leakage. Another issue is that the aim of these
analyses have been to evaluate a single protocol, none that we
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are aware of is designed to be generic enough to evaluate a
wide range of protocols.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present the models we assume in this paper.
A. Network Model
We consider a sensor network to be a graph G = (V,E) where
V represents the set of nodes and E the set of links between
the nodes. When a link exists between two nodes m,n, then
m and n can directly communicate with each other and are
called neighbours. There is a dedicated node in the network
called a sink, which is responsible for data collection and
linking the network to the outside world. A path is a finite
sequence 〈n1 · n2 . . . nj〉 of nodes. A source-converging path
is a path with nj = s (In this paper, unless specified otherwise,
a path means a source-converging path). A finite path can be
converted into an infinite path through the introduction of loops.
For example, when a (finite) path terminates at a source, we
can augment it through the infinite repetition of the final node,
i.e., self-loop at the source 〈n1 ·n2 . . . s · s · s . . .〉. For a given
(finite) path p, we denote by |pn| (resp. |pt|) the number of
nodes (resp. the number of transitions) in p. We also denote
by lp¯ (resp. p¯l) the prefix of p of length l (resp. the suffix of
p of length l).
The nodes sense the environment, and when a node detects
an event of interest (i.e., the presence of an asset) the node
broadcasts information about the event to the network and is
called a source node. In this paper, we focus on the case where
there is only a single source node in the network (i.e., there
is only a single asset to protect). We denote the source by s.
We also assume that the source transmits a single message in
every time unit. When a node transmits a new message, its
neighbours forward the message in the following time unit. This
process is repeated until the message is eventually collected
at the sink. We thus assume that all nodes take exactly one
time unit to receive, process and forward a new message. The
message is routed towards the sink using a multi-hop routing
protocol R. We model the routing protocol R as a matrix,
with R[i, j] representing the probability that node j receives a
message from node i first, after the message is transmitted by
the source. This means that a node can only potentially receive
a message first from a neighbour that is closer to the source
node. In other words, a node cannot receive a message first
along a route which is not the shortest path from the source
to that node.
B. Privacy Model
The overall objective of any WSN-based SLP solution is to
ensure that the asset (at a given location) is never captured
through information leaked by the WSN. However, we make
two observations:
1) If the asset is static, then the attacker can perform an
exhaustive search of the network to find the asset. In this
case, the SLP problem becomes irrelevant. Specifically,
if there exists no time bound on the capture time, then
an exhaustive search is a trivial solution, yet effective
solution.
2) On the other hand, if the asset is mobile, then performing
an exhaustive search of the network is unsuitable, as the
attacker may zoom in on a given location only to find
out that the asset has moved. Thus, the SLP problem can
only be considered when it is time-bounded, capturing
the maximum amount of time there mobile asset will
spend at a given location.
This notion of time bound has been termed as safety period
in the literature. There are two alternative definitions of safety
period: The first, used primarily by routing-based techniques,
e.g. [5], is where the safety period is defined as the time
required to capture the asset. The aim of these techniques is to
maximise the safety period, i.e., the higher the time to capture,
the higher the SLP level provided.
The second notion of safety period is used where it is
desirable to bound the amount of time SLP is being considered
for, i.e., if an attacker fails to capture a source within the
specified safety period, then we say SLP has been provided.
That notion of safety period intuitively captures the maximum
time an asset will be at a given location before its next
movement. Often, this can be obtained from previous data
gathering to know more about such mobile assets.
This second notion of safety period is more generic that the
first one in that, rather than attempting to maximise the amount
of time an asset isn’t captured (as under the first definition),
the second definition captures the fact that the asset can’t be
reached before a certain time limit, i.e., setting the time limit
to be ∞ in the second instance results in the first definition.
In this paper, we thus use the time bound model of safety
period.
C. Attacker Model
It was shown in [24] that the strength of a WSN attacker can
be factored along two dimensions, namely (i) presence and (ii)
actions. Presence may, for example, be local while actions can
be eavesdropping, crash or reprogramming among others. In
this paper, we assume a distributed eavesdropper attacker. We
chose a distributed attacker as the attacker can move around
the network, gathering further information and the only action
that he can perform is eavesdropping. Though being a weak
attacker model, an attacker with a stronger set of actions will
likely interfere with its stated objective of capturing the asset.
For example, if the attacker attempts to jam signals at a given
location, then the attacker cannot progress within the network
to reach the asset within the specified safety period.
We assume the distributed eavesdropper to be initially located
at the sink, since he is guaranteed to detect the arrival of a
message at that location. Wherever the attacker is located,
upon receiving (i.e., overhearing) the first new message at that
location, the attacker moves to the neighbour who relayed the
message. The reason to focus on the first new message is that
the message has, with high probability, travelled along the
shortest path from the source to the sink. To achieve this, we
assume that the attacker has sufficient capabilities to determine
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the direction in which he receives the message, although the
range of its detection is assumed to be limited and does not
extend to the entire network. Thus, when the attacker hears a
new message, it makes a step towards the source. This process
can be repeated a number of times until the attacker reaches
the source node, whereby it captures the asset. Such a routing
protocol that provides little protection to the source location is
called a normal routing protocol N or protectionless.
The distributed eavesdropper attacker does not keep track
of history information, i.e., it may revisit a node that it has
previously visited. Thus, a path an attacker takes to capture
an asset may contain loops. Also, given a safety period λ and
since only one message is sent in a single time unit, we focus
on path of length at least λ, i.e., if a path ending at the source s
is of length less than λ, then we extend the path with sufficient
number of repetitions of s until the path has length of λ.
IV. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we first state the problem we address and
subsequently analyse the problem to obtain relevant SLP-aware
routing protocols.
A. Problem Statement
The problem we address is the following: When an attacker
is initially located at the sink and starts receiving messages
sent by the source to the sink, an important problem is to
determine the (maximum) probability that the attacker will
be able to reach the source and capture the asset within a
specified maximum time bound. To ensure that the attacker
does not follow any path he so desires (hence performing
random backtracking), the attacker uses the routing protocol
to achieve his objective of reaching the source node.
Formally, the problem specification is shown in Figure 1.
Given:
• A network G = (V,E),
• A distributed eavesdropper attacker A that is located
at the sink initially,
• A source location s ∈ V ,
• A safety period λ,
• A maximum capture threshold δ that determines the
SLP level required and
• A normal routing protocol RN ,
Objective:
Transform RN into RS such that:
• There exists a path from s to the sink using RS .
• A reaches s with probability of at most δ within λ
using RS .
Fig. 1: Problem Definition: Transformation to a SLP-Aware
Routing Protocol.
We call RS a λ-SLP routing protocol (or simply an
SLP-aware routing protocol). Specifically, the objective is to
understand the steps required to transform a normal (non SLP-
aware) routing protocol into an SLP-aware routing protocol, i.e.,
to determine the properties that underpin a λ-SLP routing RS .
Observe that RN and RS do not need to have any relationship,
with the exception that a source still needs to be able to send
messages to the sink.
One way towards solving the above problem is to develop
a protocol and then perform a performance analysis of the
protocol to determine its efficiency, for example [23], thereby
understanding the possible bottlenecks. Such an analysis then
allows the protocol under analysis to be possibly refined.
However, this technique constrains the search for a protocol
that can optimally solve the above problem.
Given that an attacker takes a step along a single hop
within a given time unit, we model the attacker movement
as a time series. In doing this, we analyse the problem from
the perspective of privacy protection of time-series data. This
enables us to consider routing protocols abstractly to be able
to determine the necessary properties. We thus consider the
problem of quantifying the protection of time-series data which
have been perturbed by some arbitrary perturbation model. As
the perturbation model is closely related to the transformation
of RN into RS , this then provides the ability to determine
the development of a SLP routing protocol that potentially
minimises privacy loss, i.e., a δ-SLP routing protocol.
B. Problem Analysis
We first present the notations used in the rest of the paper
before subsequently presenting an analysis of the transformation
required.
1) Notation: We use the following notations in the rest of
the paper, where X and Y are two random variables:
Pr
X
(x) = Pr (X = x)
Pr
XY
(x, y) = Pr (X = x,Y = y)
2) Definitions:
• N is a random variable of attacker transitions under a
protectionless routing protocol RN . In essence, we let a
trace of clear time-series data of an attacker movement
under a protectionless routing RN to be a stochastic
process N = {Ni}, where i is the time index and the
Ni’s form a sequence of random variables.
• S is a random variable of attacker transitions under a
SLP routing protocol RS . Thus, we let the trace of noisy
time-series data generated by an SLP routing protocol RS
to be a stochastic process S = {Si}, where i is the time
index and the Si’s form a sequence of random variables.
• RN is a routing matrix for normal routing, whereRN [i, j]
represents the probability j receives a message from i
first under N
• RS is a routing matrix for SLP aware routing, where
RS [i, j] represents the probability j receives a message
from i first under S
• There is a safety period λ which is the amount of time
units or steps it takes the attacker to reach a source (on
average) from the time it first receives a normal message.
• The time domain is denoted by T .
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Note that our routing matrices are different to those in [23]
which contain the probability that the routing algorithm chooses
the next node. Our routing matrices contain the probability a
message is received from a node.
Thus, in this setting, the objective can be recast as follows:
develop a transformation P that transforms RN into RS
such that, using some information theoretic measure of a
dissimilarity metric, the dissimilarity betweenN and S captures
the SLP level imparted by P , which implements the SLP-aware
protocol.
3) Assumptions:
• An attacker can distinguish between a message that has
been seen before and a message that has never been seen.
C. Analysis
In this section, we identify the characteristics of a routing
protocol that can provide a high level of SLP. To do this,
we need a measure of privacy for evaluating the level on
SLP enhancement provided by a given solution. There are
several potential definitions for a privacy metrics and this
paper provides a survey of some of these metrics [25].
In this paper, we focus on the mutual information metric
between two random variables N and S , denoted by I(N ;S),
which is defined as follows:
I(N ;S) = H(N )−H(N|S) (1)
H(N ) denotes the entropy on H whereas H(N|S) denotes
the entropy on H given S. If the uncertainty on N is the same
when (an SLP protection scheme) S is in use, then it implies
that no SLP protection is lost, i.e., the attacker does not learn
anything new about N through S . Then, it means that N and
S are independent.
if H(N ) = H(N|S) =⇒ I(N ;S) = 0 (2)
Now, to obtain I(N ;S), we need to calculate H(N|S):
H(N|S) =
∑
f∈S
Pr
S
(f)H(N|S = f)
= −
∑
n∈N
∑
f∈S
Pr
S
(f) Pr
N
(n|f) log Pr
N
(n|f)
= −
∑
n∈N
∑
f∈S
Pr
S
(f)
PrNS (n, f)
PrS (f)
log Pr
N
(n|f)
=
∑
n∈N
∑
f∈S
Pr
NS
(n, f) log
PrS (f)
PrNS (n, f)
(3)
Substituting Equation 3 into Equation 1, mutual information
is then given by:
I(N ;S) =
∑
n∈N
∑
f∈S
Pr
NS
(n, f) log
PrNS (n, f)
PrN (n) PrS (f)
(4)
To evaluate I(N ;S), we need to evaluate PrNS (n, f) in
Equation 4. Using a time period λ′ ∝ λ, we have:
Pr
NS
(n, f) = Pr
N
(n|f) Pr
S
(f) (5)
=
λ′∑
τ=0
Pr
NT
(n, τ |f) Pr
S
(f) (6)
PrNS (n, f) captures the probability that the attacker will
take transition n within λ′ steps, if transition f is his next
transition. Here, with a safety period of λ, the value λ′
represents the amount of time units the attacker needs to
be “stalled” (e.g., either through diversion or bypassing it).
Typically, the safety period λ ≤ λ′ + α, where α represents
the minimum number of time units for an attacker to reach the
source, starting from the sink. Thus, in the rest of the paper,
since λ′ ∝ λ, λ′ can be easily evaluated from λ.
Pr
N
(n|S = f) =
∑
n∈N
λ′∑
τ=0
Pr
NT
(n, τ |f) (7)
=
∑
n∈N
ωf · λ′∑
τ=0
(R′S)τ · ωn>
 (8)
ωx is a vector whose length is equal to the number of nodes
in the network and is defined as follows:
ωx =
1 if xth entry0 otherwise (9)
On the other hand, ωn> represents the transpose of ωn. The
matrix R′S is obtained from RS as follows:
R′S [i, j] =
RS [i, j] if (i, j) 6= n0 otherwise (10)
For I(N ;S) (Equation 4) to be minimised, then PrNS (n, f)
needs to be 0 for all relevant (n, f) combinations, i.e., the
objective is to define RS such that PrN (n|f) is minimised.
Now, to compute PrN (n|f), we need R′S which, in turn,
requires RS to be defined1. The way RS is defined gives
rise to different SLP protocols. As mentioned earlier, we seek
a notion of dissimilarity between RS and S such that the
dissimilarity level is indicative of the SLP level provided by S .
It was shown in [26] that the notion of information loss varies
inversely with privacy loss (see Figure 2), i.e., the higher the
information that is lost or the more perturbed the clear data
time-series is, the less privacy is lost.
To this end, we adapt the following definition of information
loss [25] (Equation 11), which is used in privacy-preserving
data mining, to suit the SLP problem (see Equation 12):
IL(DN , DS) =
∑n
i=1 |fDN (i)− fDS (i)|∑n
i=1 fDN (i)
(11)
1Since R′S = RS for all entries except for one entry n, we will use RS
to mean R′S in the rest of the paper.
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Fig. 2: Information Loss vs Privacy Loss representative of [26,
Fig. 8] depending on the perturbation model used.
where DN and DS represent the clear and noisy domains
respectively, and fD(i) represents the frequency of the data
item i in domain D.
Since we assume normal transitions can be used, especially
after the safety period has elapsed, we adapt the information
loss definition as follows:
IL(DN , DS) =
∑n
i=1
∣∣fDN (i)− fDS (iλ)∣∣∑n
i=1 fDN (i)
(12)
Where FDN (i) and FDS (iλ) are defined as:
FDN (i) =
1 if transition i is used in N0 otherwise (13)
FDS (iλ) =
1 if i is not taken within λ steps in S0 otherwise (14)
Basically, Equation 12 states that the more dissimilar the set
of transitions taken within λ time units are, the greater is the
information loss, hence the lesser the privacy loss.
If IL(DN , DS) = 1 (i.e., is maximum), then it implies that
DN ∩DS = ∅. In other words, to minimise privacy loss, RN
and RS cannot share any transition. More specifically, it means
that, though RN and RS can share transitions, an attacker
cannot take some transition in RN under RS within λ time
units. This then means that RN has to be transformed in such a
way that for a certain duration, for any transition (i, j) unique
in RS , an attacker at location j needs to receive a message
from i first.
V. PERTURBATION MODEL: PROPER COMPETING PATHS
To understand the transformation of RN into RS , i.e., to
understand how RN can perturbed into RS , we introduce the
concept of competing paths.
Definition 1 (Competing Paths): Given a network G = (V,E)
and a protectionless routing protocol RN , two distinct paths p1
and p2 under RN compete at a node n ∈ V iff the following
are satisfied:
• p1 and p2 are source-converging paths.
• ∃(i, j), (i, j′) ∈ E : (i, j) ∈ p1 ∧ (i, j′) ∈ p2 : i = n
• RN [j, n] > 0 ∧RN [j′, n] ≥ 0, j 6= j′
The idea of competing paths is that if one path is part
of the clear data time-series, then the other can be used in
the noisy data time-series. Specifically, it means that if the
attacker is more likely to follow a given path p1 under RN ,
then the attacker can be made to follow path p2 under RS . We
call node n a junction node. To make this concrete, consider
Figure 3. SinceRN [2, 5] = 0.5 andRN [4, 5] = 0.5, then paths
〈(5, 2) · (2, 1)〉 and 〈(5, 4) · (4, 1)〉 compete at node 5. Observe
that the notion of competing paths increases the entropy at the
node they are competing at. We call p1 a normal path and p2
a perturbed path.
However, as can be observed, not all competing paths
can prevent the attacker from reaching the source within
the required safety period. We thus strengthen the notion of
competing paths to that of proper competing paths.
Corollary 1: All paths compete at the sink.
Definition 2 (Proper Competing Paths): Given a network
G = (V,E) and a protectionless routing protocol RN , two
distinct paths p1 and p2 under RN compete properly at a node
n ∈ V iff the following are satisfied:
• p1 and p2 are source-converging paths.
• ∃(i, j), (i, j′) ∈ E : (i, j) ∈ p1 ∧ (i, j′) ∈ p2 : i = n
• RN [j, n] > 0 ∧RN [j′, n] = 0
Here, for two proper competing paths, the attacker cannot
receive the message first along one of these paths and we
call node n a proper junction node. Thus, path p1 should
be perturbed into path p2 in the noisy data time-series. The
intuition is that the attacker, at a proper junction node, has
two distinct choices and one of those choices is one he would
unlikely have made under normal circumstances. As before,
we call p1 a normal path and p2 a properly perturbed path.
Lemma 1: Given a network G = (V,E), a protectionless
routing protocol RN , an attacker A that starts at the sink,
safety period λ, and a path p1 under RN with |pt1| ≤ λ. Then
there exists a path p2 with |pt2| > λ such that ∃n ∈ p1, p2 and
p1 and p2 properly compete at n.
Proof. We have to prove that, along p1, there exists a node
n such that p1 and p2 properly compete at n and that |pt2| > λ.
We prove this by contradiction: We assume that there
exists no such path p2 and subsequently show a contradiction.
Consider a node i ∈ p1 and one of its neighbours j which
is further from the source. According to our assumption, we
have that 0 < RN [i, j] ≤ 1. Since we assume that no p2 exists
that can properly compete with p1, i.e., no proper junction
node exists, we have that ∀j, (i, j) ∈ E : 0 < RN [i, j] ≤ 1.
However, ∃k : (i, k) ∈ E is further from the source than i,
then we have that RN [k, i] = 0, which is a contradiction. Thus,
such a p2 exists and the proper junction node is node j. Path
p2 is also of length |pt2| > λ, by repeating the transition (i, j)
λ times. 
The intuition is that p1 is a path that an attacker may follow
under the protectionless protocol RN to capture the asset,
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while p2 provides a “diversion” via a path that the attacker
will not normally follow. This path should be long enough
to adequately delay the attacker. Further, p2 also captures the
fact that p1 can be perturbed into p2 at the identified proper
junction node. Such a path p2 will need to be guaranteed to
occur under a routing protocol.
Using Figure 3, for example, we have the following:
• p1 := 〈(5, 4) · (4, 1)〉. Setting λ = 4, we have
p1 := 〈(5, 4) · (4, 1) · (1, 1) · (1, 1) · (1, 1) · (1, 1) · (1, 1)〉.
• Then, p2 as follows:
p2 := 〈(5, 4) · (4, 5) · (5, 4) · (4, 5) · (5, 4) · (4, 1) · (1, 1)〉.
Notice that the attacker reaches the asset at node 1 in p1
within λ steps while it doesn’t in p2.
At this point, a proper junction point needs to be selected.
Since the attacker starts at the sink, the sink is the first candidate
to be considered as a proper junction point. If the sink is not
a proper junction point, we iteratively select a normal path
under RN at random and identify proper junction points. Once
a proper junction node is selected, a properly perturbed path
needs to be selected to obtain the routing matrix RS , i.e.,
choosing a set of properly perturbed paths.
Hence, we propose the following heuristic to generate the
set of properly perturbed paths at a given proper junction node.
Algorithm 1 Generating set of properly perturbed paths
1: NormalPaths ← set of all normal paths from sink
2: while NormalPaths 6= ∅ do
3: NextNode ← sink
4: while NextNode 6= source do
5: if ∃ i : RN [i,NextNode] = 0 then
6: ppp ← {p | generate path p through i
7: such that λp¯ 6∈ RN }
8: else
9: NextNode ← CHOOSE({i|(i,NextNode) ∈
E,RN [i,NextNode] 6= 0})
Then, we generate the routing matrix RS for the perturbed
time series as follows:
Algorithm 2 Generating SLP-aware routing matrix
1: RS ← RN
2: select one path p2 ∈ ppp from above.
3: for (i, j) ∈ p2 do
4: RS [, i] ← 0 . Deleting normal paths
5: RS [j, i] ← 1 . Ensuring attacker follows chosen
6: properly perturbed path
Theorem 1 (Privacy Loss): A network G = (V,E), A
distributed eavesdropper attacker A that is located at the sink
initially, a source location s ∈ V , a safety period λ, a maximum
capture threshold δ that determines the SLP level required and
a normal routing protocol RN , then RS generated as above
results in PrN (n|S = f) = 0 (Equation 8), with δ = 0.
Proof. By construction,
∑
n∈N
(
ωf ·∑λτ=0(R′S)τ · ωn>)
= 0 as
∑λ
τ=0(R
′
S)
τ = 0, with (R′S)τ = 0 defined as in
Equation 10, solving the problem of Figure 1 . 
The intuition here is that, by construction, the attacker is
sent on a diversion long enough that it only takes a normal
transition after the safety period has elapsed. Further, Theorem 1
also shows that the resulting SLP-aware routing protocol
causes minimal privacy loss as the attacker does not reach
a normal transition within the safety period, i.e., according to
Equation 12, the information loss is maximal as RS reuses
some transitions of RN , but only after the safety period is
over.
VI. A CASE STUDY
In this section, we present a simple case study showing the
viability of our approach. Using the network shown in Figure 3,
with the sink at the centre of the network and the source on the
border of the network, we define RN as below. For example,
RN [1, 2] = 1 means that node 2 will receive a message first
from node 1. On the other hand, RN [2, 5] = 0.5 means there
is a 50% chance that node 5 will receive a message first from
node 2 (the other possibility is from 4). The set of normal
paths is given by {〈(5, 2) · (2, 1)〉, 〈(5, 4) · (4, 1)〉}. Here, we
set λ, the safety period to 4.
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Fig. 3: Example 3×3 network grid
RN :
Se
nd
in
g
N
od
es
Receiving Nodes
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 0 0.5 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 1 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(15)
Here, the first proper junction node is node 5, the sink. Any
properly perturbed path will start with transition (5, 6) or (5, 8).
Applying the heuristic to generate RS shows that (i) it is first
required to reset the values of node 5 and then set the value
of the relevant transition to 1. This is shown in the matrix
RS , where the old value is stricken off and replaced by the
new value, shown in bold. For example, it means that RS [6, 5]
needs to be set to 1 to ensure that the attacker moves to node
7
6 from the sink, rather than move towards either node 2 or 4.
This is performed for each transition in one of the properly
perturbed paths.
As can be observed, an attacker will now take the following
path: 5 · 6 · 9 · 8 · 7 · 4 · 1, meaning that the attacker requires
6 transitions to reach the source, more than the safety period.
Hence, it means that the attacker cannot catch the source before
the safety period has expired.
RS :
Se
nd
in
g
N
od
e
Receiving Nodes
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 1 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.5 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 1 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 1
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

(16)
VII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we briefly discuss some issues raised by the
methodology.
• There are different ways to obtain the relevant proper
perturbing paths. Specifically, a path that contains no loop
may be obtained while another path with loops may be
considered. Since the notion of paths captures source-
converging paths, it means that Equation 12 will never be
a maximum as DS will contain some elements of DN .
However, minimizing the number of common elements
will result in high information loss. Specifically, it is better
to introduce loops in (the non-overlapping elements of)
DS than in DN as this will reduce the number of common
elements.
• In this paper, we have assumed that links are bidirectional
and lossless, such that the sum of each column, apart
from the source, adds to 1. However, when links become
unidirectional or lossy (for example due to message
collisions), the sum may be less than 1. This also means
that the domain DS may be different to when the links
are bidirectional. In this case, some of the work we
propose here will have to be adapted to specifically
account for unidirectional links. On the other hand, if the
unidirectional nature of links is transient, i.e., is short-lived,
the current framework can still work if nodes are made to
perform retransmissions (at the link-layer level). However,
this technique will not work if message collisions occur.
Most often, sensor nodes are not equipped with collision
detectors and it is entirely possible that the matrix RN is
different to the one assumed, as a node j may receive a
message from node i first (in practice) rather than from
node k (as specified by RN [k, j] = 1 and RN [i, j] = 0 ).
Dealing with these two issues are part of our future work.
• The framework we have proposed is independent of any
routing protocol. However, to provide SLP, a routing
protocol will need to provide guarantees that RS will
be supported. In the example shown in Section VI, since
node 5 needs to receive a message from node 6 first, then
a possible implementation may require control messages
to be sent to notify node 6 to send a “fake” messages,
identical to normal messages, to node 5 to get the attacker
to move to node 6 first. So, in effect, our framework
provides indication of the requirements to provide high
levels of SLP. On a further note, instantiating the routing
matrix RS differently actually gives rise to different state-
of-the-art SLP-aware routing protocols. For example, if
RS is set as follows, then the routing protocol is the one
that has been proposed in [13].
Se
nd
in
g
N
od
e
Receiving Nodes
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.5
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
8 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.5
9 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0

(17)
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we address the source-location privacy problem
in wireless sensor networks from an information theoretic
viewpoint. One major advantage of using such an approach is
that it allows specific attacks and protocols to be abstracted
away, focusing instead on the amount of information that is
leaked or lost/gained by attacker. While several other works
focused on analysing specific routing protocols or privacy
metrics, we focused on understanding the basis of routing
transformations to minimize the mutual information metric.
Our framework is novel in that it allows the SLP-aware routing
matrix to be configured in different ways, to give rise to
potentially different SLP-aware routing protocols.
As future work, we will focus on (i) integrating energy usage
into the framework so a trade-off between SLP and energy
can be analysed and (ii) implementing the relevant SLP-aware
routing protocols that provide potentially optimal SLP levels
to gauge their performance in more natural settings. We will
also study the problem of selecting the best proper junction
node(s).
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